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Wednesday, 16 September 2026 · Oslo · London · New York

Startups · Analysis

European defence technology has money now. It still has a procurement problem.

Capital and political will arrived faster than the purchasing systems that would let a small company actually sell to a ministry.

An institutional corridor with high windows
An institutional corridor with high windows

Independent coverage

A

By AJ Dellinger

Contributing Writer — Cybersecurity / Tech Policy · Freelance

Edited by Clara Bergman

Published 9 August 2026

7 min read

Evidence: Analysis

Three years ago, European defence technology startups had a fundraising problem. That problem is largely solved. Dedicated funds exist, generalist investors participate, and several national schemes co-invest.

The remaining problem is the customer.

Why selling to a ministry is hard for a small company

Defence procurement is designed for large programmes with long lifecycles, extensive certification and prime contractors who can carry the administrative burden. Each of those features is rational and each excludes a twenty-person company.

The practical effects are consistent across the founders interviewed. Procurement cycles that outlast a startup's runway. Requirements written around an incumbent's existing product. Payment terms that assume a balance sheet the supplier does not have.

What is being tried

Fast-track schemes in several countries now provide small, quick contracts intended to let a ministry buy from a startup without running a full programme competition.

These work as far as they go, and the recurring complaint is that they end at the pilot. A successful trial does not convert into a production contract, because the production contract runs through the old process.

The dual use argument, examined

Many European defence technology companies describe themselves as dual use, partly from conviction and partly because it broadens the investor base and softens the recruiting conversation.

It is a genuine category in some domains, notably sensing, communications and autonomy. It is a fiction in others, and the fiction is unhelpful to everyone, including the founders who then face an uncomfortable conversation with employees later.

The measure that matters

Not funds announced, and not pilot programmes started. The number to watch is how many European defence technology companies founded after 2022 hold a production contract with a European ministry.

It is a small number. It is the number that determines whether this sector exists in a decade.

Sources

Published 9 August 2026